Chinese agriculture has undergone a quiet transformation in the past fĳifteen years. The "old agriculture" of grain, cotton, and oil crops has seen a tremendous rise in uses of machinery (and also farm chemicals) to save labor. At the same time, the capital and labor dual-intensifying "new agriculture" of higher-value products-vegetables, fruit, meat, poultry, fĳish-has expanded greatly. These changes have been accompanied by substantial declines in the number of people working in agriculture. Together, the changes add up to a high degree of "capitalization" (i.e., increased capital inputs per unit labor) in Chinese agriculture. This article presents detailed quantitative evidence for these commonly neglected changes. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the capitalization has been powered principally by peasant household investments, more than state or capitalist fĳirm investments. This fact points to the need to rely more on peasant initiative in the future, by providing greater state guidance and support for peasant family farm-based endeavors, rather than strongly favoring "dragon head" enterprises as in the past decade.
sion's sampling of 68,000 selected households. Similar tendencies are evident in cotton, soybeans, and oil crops, the other major crops of the "old agriculture."
The costs-benefĳits survey sample, however, might well be skewed toward more "advanced" households, for reasons to be examined in detail below. Nevertheless, even lower estimates, based on the 1996 and 2006 national decennial survey of all farm households, suggest impressive expansions in the use of machinery and thin plastic covers (to control temperature, moisture, and sometimes also weeds), about three-fold in the period 1996-2010. At the same time, the decline in birth rates since the 1970s and the tide of out-migration of peasants for offf-farm work have together resulted in a marked decline during recent years in the size of the rural workforce, by about 5 million each year after the turn of the century, increasing since 2006 to nearly 10 million a year. At the same time, offf-farm employment within rural China itself has also increased rapidly. The combined result is that during this past decade, the number of farming persons has declined by an average of 12 million each year, dropping from 320 million in 2001 to less than 200 million in 2010.
The dimensions of the increase have been such as to propel a quiet revolution in farming methods. In contrast to the pre-1995 "revolution" in farming, which had been mainly an extension of the original "green revolution" (principally increased use of chemical fertilizers and scientifĳic seed selection) that had driven the modernization of Chinese grain farming since the 1960s, the last fĳifteen years or so have seen this new change of greatly increased use of machinery and farm chemicals 农药 to save labor. Because so little has been done along these lines, the quantifĳication we present is of necessity very detailed, perhaps even overly so. Our data show that such operating capital investments in the old agriculture might have totaled, as an upper-limit estimate, about 407.3 billion yuan in 2010. A lower, perhaps more reliable, estimate is 244.0 billion. They have brought a degree of "capitalization" (in the sense of increased use of capital per unit labor) that is surprising and has changed the "old" agriculture in fundamental ways.
The other main change has been great expansions of the "new agriculture"-of higher-value farm products that are both capital-and labor-intensifying, such as vegetables, fruits, meats, poultry, fĳish, eggs, and milk. Those generally require several times more investment of operating capital than grain, for fertilizers and other special modern inputs (e.g., more fertilizers for vegetables, processed feed for farm animals, and special bags 果袋 needed for growing high-value apples). The total of such increased operating capital investments in small-scale household production of eight major products (vegetables, apples, pigs, dairy cows, cattle, mutton and lamb, chickens, eggs) of the new agriculture amounted to 1218.6 billion yuan (in 2010). Since we limit ourselves here to the new, more advanced agriculture, there is not the same problem here of possible skewing in data toward the more advanced forms.
The new agriculture also requires capital investments in fĳixed assets 固定资产, such as plastic tents for vegetables (commonly termed "agriculture with infrastructure" 设施农业), fruit orchards, structures for animal raising, fĳish ponds, and so on. The total of such investments from peasant households reached by 2010 about 230.5 billion yuan.
Peasant capital investments (fĳixed and liquid, old and new agriculture), at a combined total of 1,693.1 billion yuan, have come initially mainly from earnings from the peasants' offf-farm work, totaling about 5,000 billion yuan in 2010, and have been sustained partly by the higher returns from the new agriculture. That dwarfs investments by both the state and agricultural fĳirms. In other words, peasant households have been the main force behind the vigorous capitalization of agriculture in the past fĳifteen years.
Needless to say, the phenomena described above have been most apparent in the more advanced east coast regions and areas adjacent to urban centers, and less so in inland, outlying or mountainous areas.
What is unmistakable is that, despite the unfair treatment as second-class citizens they have received for offf-farm work in China's second-class "informal economy" (no labor law protection, lower wages, longer hours, and little or no benefĳits compared to urban residents-Huang 2009), peasants have in fact made huge contributions to furthering China's agricultural development. The record argues for policies that would facilitate and support still greater contributions from peasant family farms.
Increased Use of Machinery and Labor-Saving Farm Chemicals in the "Old Agriculture"
According to the National Development and Reform Commission's sampling of 68,000 households on costs-benefĳits in diffferent crops between 1995 and 2010, use of farm machinery in grain farming (using the three main grain crops-rice, wheat, maize-as a proxy for all grain) increased no less than fĳive-to six-fold (from roughly 10-20 yuan per mu to about 60-100 yuan in "constant prices" 不变价格), as shown in Figure 1 . At the same time, use of herbicides (to control weeds and save labor, mainly in rice farming) and pesticides (to control insects) increased two-to three-fold, from about 5-15 yuan per mu to about 10-45 yuan per mu, shown in Figure 2 .
These changes have occurred while investments in the other two major modern inputs, chemical fertilizer and improved seeds (the main propellants Source. The data in current prices come from the costs-benefĳits surveys in Quanguo nongchanpin chengben shouyi ziliao huibian (hereafter Quanguo nongchanpin), 2007, 2011: tables 1-2-1, 1-7-2, 1-8-2. Constant prices are obtained by using the "farm machinery" 机械化农具 price index (in the price indices for diffferent agricultural "means of production" 生产资料) to arrive at adjusted constant prices. The data for indexed prices for diffferent agricultural means of production come from the Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 1997-1999: (Figures 3 and 4) . The result has been a large increase in the proportion occupied by machinery and farm chemicals inputs in all (circulating) capital inputs into farming: from about 15 percent (machinery inputs) + 11 percent (farm chemicals), or 26 percent of all "modern inputs" (farm machinery inputs + chemical fertilizer + improved seeds + farm chemicals), up to 54 percent (37 percent farm machinery and 17 percent farm chemicals). Similar tendencies have occurred in soybeans and oil crops (8.6 percent of sown acreage in 2009) and cotton (3.1 percent), the other major components of the "old agriculture." The tendency in machinery use in cotton, soybeans, and oil crops closely parallels that in grain. In cotton and soybeans, per mu use of machinery rose from just 5-10 yuan in 1996 to 50-60 yuan in 2010 (Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007 (Quanguo nongchanpin, , 2011 : tables 1-9-2, 1-11-2, 1-12-2, 1-13-2). Farm chemicals (i.e., pesticides and herbicides) use has risen substantially also, though not to the same degree as machinery use (Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007 (Quanguo nongchanpin, , 2011 : tables 1-9-2, 1-11-2, 1-12-2, 1-13-2). Chemical fertilizer use too has shown considerable increase, though again not to nearly the same degree as machinery use (Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007 (Quanguo nongchanpin, , 2007 : tables 1-9-2, 1-11-2, 1-12-2, 1-13-2).
According to the costs-benefĳits data in 2010, cotton used an average of 307 yuan per mu of modern inputs (of machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticidesherbicides, and seeds). Soybeans, at 5 percent of sown acreage, used 146 yuan for the same four inputs; peanuts, at 2.8 percent of total sown acreage, used 289 yuan; and rapeseed, at 4.6 percent of sown acreage, used 125 yuan.
Combining all major crops of the old agriculture, Table 1 shows that the three grains (rice, wheat, maize), cotton, soybeans, and the three major oil crops accounted for a combined total of 69.6 percent of all sown acreage in 2010. They used in 2010 a combined total of 407.3 billion yuan of modern Source. The data for farm chemicals inputs in current prices come from the costsbenefĳits surveys in Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007, 2011: table 1-2-2, 1-7-2, 1-8-2. Constant prices are obtained by using the "farm chemicals" price index (in the price indices for diffferent agricultural "means of production") to arrive at adjusted constant prices. The data for indexed prices for diffferent agricultural means of production come from the Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 1997-1999: . This fĳigure may be taken as an approximation of total liquid capital investments in the old "big fĳield" agriculture, according to the costs-benefĳits survey data.
A Diffferent Set of Data
However, we are inclined to think that the costs-benefĳits data used above need to be adjusted downward in light of the more systematic and thorough decennial survey of all farm households done in 1996 and 2006. As we have detailed earlier (Huang, Gao, and Peng, 2012) , those two surveys required that every household be interviewed and that standardized tables be fĳilled in on the spot by the interviewer and interviewees together. The surveys are comparable in design, scale, and detail to the decennial population surveys. We showed earlier that while the cost-benefĳits sampling of 68,000 households suggests that perhaps 5-10 percent of all labor in farming were hired, the decennial household-by-household survey suggests a substantially lower fĳigure of 3 percent. And we were in the end inclined to trust in the latter fĳigure. Indeed, the State Statistical Bureau has been adjusting the earlier fĳigures in its China Rural Statistical Yearbook on the basis of the decennial surveys, in the same manner as it has adjusted population, employment, and other data to accord with the more reliable decennial population surveys. As we suggested earlier, the sampling work has in fact been subject to the conflicting tugs of two diffferent purposes and tendencies. One, shown for example in a speech given by the chairman of the agency conducting the survey, spoke explicitly of the purpose of the "model function of the surveyed household" to "show the peasants a visible path to becoming rich" (Zhao Xiaoping, 2004; cf. Huang, Gao and Peng, 2012: 149) . The other, coming perhaps from the professional dispositions of the statisticians involved, seeks to reflect accurately the national picture-hence the effforts to adjust the data to accord with the Source. Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2011: table 7-2; Quanguo nongchanpin, 2011: tables 1-2-2, 1-7-2, 1-8-2, 1-9-2, 1-11-2, 1-12-2, 1-13-2.
decennial national surveys. The tensions between the two tendencies seem as yet not completely resolved. We need therefore to use the decennial data as a check on the costs-benefĳits data, and perhaps even in preference to the latter. However, while systematic and thorough, the decennial data are not as specifĳic with respect to farm operations as the costs-benefĳits data. They do not permit a check on the same categories used by the sampling data. Rather, we have to content ourselves with suggestive indicators based on diffferent, simpler categories. Table 2 compares trends indicated by the total number of tractors owned at year-end, divided into big-middle 大中型 and small sized 小型, given in the decennial surveys and by the machinery inputs per mu for grain given in the costs-benefĳits sampling data.
Clearly, the dimensions of increase suggested by the two sets of data are quite diffferent. In one, in the ten-year period from 1996 to 2006, total farm machinery roughly doubled; in the other, in the same period, it tripled. Projecting the fĳirst trend down to 2010, machinery use might have tripled; in the latter, it went up fĳive-fold. The average annual increase rate in the fĳirst is roughly 7 percent. In the other, it is more than 18 percent.
Another useful indicator is the amount of "thin plastic" 薄膜 used to cover crops for purposes of temperature and moisture (and sometimes also weed) control. Table 3 shows the diffferent fĳigures given by the decennial survey and the China Rural Statistical Yearbook, which has routinely incorporated the costs-benefĳits survey data. We have opted to rely more on the decennial surveys of every household here. The former is extrapolated from sampling data; the latter is based on an actual household-by-household count.
As can readily be seen in Table 3 , the China Rural Statistical Yearbook possibly exaggerated the extent of such farming-most likely because of the tendency to select more advanced farms in its sampling.1 On the other hand, we should point out that the two sets of data difffer little when it comes to farm chemicals and chemical fertilizer use (Zhongguo di er ci, 2008 : table 3-2-11; compare with Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2008: table 3-9). This is probably because there is not much diffference between the "average" farm and the more advanced farm when it comes to those two inputs. Both kinds of farms, it may be surmised, tend to approximate the optimal levels under the same given ecological conditions and input prices.
For now, until better data become available, we might use the decennial fĳig-ures as a low estimate of increases in modern inputs (of machinery and plastic covers), and the costs-benefĳits sampling data as the high estimate. Projecting down to 2010 from 1996-2006, the former argues for about a three-fold increase in total, while the latter argues for fĳive-fold, as we have seen. We ourselves are once more inclined to the decennial survey data as the more reliable and accurate. Using the fraction of 3/5 to adjust our costs-benefĳits data downward, we would come to a fĳigure of 244 billion yuan (407.3 bn. × 0.6) in total liquid capital investments in the old agriculture.
Capitalization in the "New Agriculture"
The rise of the "new agriculture" of higher-value farm products and the resulting transformation in the structure of Chinese agriculture have amounted to what Philip Huang has termed a "hidden agricultural revolution" 隐性农业革命. The combination of increased capitalization of the old and the new agricul-1 Unfortunately, the China Rural Statistical Yearbook does not give any data for the still more important category of "agriculture with infrastructure" 设施农业, which includes tented farming of vegetables, mushrooms, some fruits and nursery farming, as does the decennial survey (Zhongguo di er ci, 2008: 10, tures is the two-sided change that has wrought the basic transformation of Chinese agriculture in the past decade and a half. Fortunately, because we are concerned here in this section only with the new and advanced segments of agriculture, we can simply rely on the costsbenefĳits sampling data, without having to deal with the discrepancies of data between the decennial surveys and the costs-benefĳits sampling.
Investment in Fixed Assets
The new agriculture involves, fĳirst of all, more fĳixed assets investment (e.g., tented vegetables, structures for animal raising, investments in fruit orchards, fĳish ponds, and so on). A good indication of such investments is the statistical category of "fĳixed asset investment" 固定资产投资, broken down into the "primary, secondary and tertiary sectors" 第一、二、三产业, or agriculture, industry, and services. Those investments in agriculture are further broken down by the source of fĳixed asset investment, from state owned 国有经济, to collective 集体经济 (divided into rural collectives 农村集体 and non-rural collectives), and individual or household investments 个体, which is further broken down to "rural individual" 农村个体, and non-rural.
As Table 4 shows, the state and rural individuals/households have been the main investors in fĳixed assets, the state's total rising from just over 10 billion yuan in 1996 to more than 240 billion yuan in 2010. This reflects the state's expanded role in investments for agricultural infrastructure, the biggest item of which is for water control 水利 (Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2010: 1997-1999, 2001, 2003-2011: table for "main categories of fĳixed assets investments of the entire society" 全社会固定资 产投资主要指标.
table 5-2). Household investments are mainly of the type already discussed above, for a transition from the old to the new agriculture. The last has increased from less than about 38 billion yuan per year in the period 1996-2000 six-fold to 230.5 billion yuan from "rural households" 农村个体 plus another 90 billion yuan from non-rural households/individuals, to reach a total of 321.4 billion yuan in 2010. The surprise is that individual household investments in fĳixed assets have equaled those from the state.
Liquid Capital Investments
In addition, there have been signifĳicantly more investments of liquid capital for the maintenance and capitalization of the new agriculture. Vegetables, especially the new-style tented vegetables, typically use about two times more chemical fertilizer than grain, ca. 200+ yuan in 2010 per mu, compared to less than 100 yuan for grain, as shown in Figure 5 . They also use much more for improved seeds, about 3.5 times more before the changes of the past decade, and in 2010, about 1.5 times as much-60 yuan per mu, compared to 40 yuan per mu for grain, shown in Figure 6 . And for farm chemicals too (not just to kill pests and weeds, but also to control funguses and viruses), about 100 yuan per mu in 2010 compared to 20 yuan for grain, or fĳive times as much, shown in Figure 7 . But vegetables use less in the way of machinery inputs, as might be expected, inasmuch as tented vegetable farming occurs in a small space (as opposed to the open "big-fĳield" old agriculture; see Figure 8 ). Such machinery as are used tend to be for activities such as the digging and leveling of earth required for setting up tents and the mechanized openings and closings of drapes for the more advanced tents.
A rough summary impression of the diffferences between the old and the new agriculture in terms of operating capital inputs can be obtained by vegetable grain comparing the two in terms of the statistical category of "material and service expenses" 物质与服务费用 per mu (with the caveat that category includes not just the costs for the "modern" inputs we have been discussing above, but also older ones like water, transport, and electrical fees). As can readily be seen from Table 5 , vegetables (in 2010) require more than 3 times as much as rice (3.2 times) or wheat (3.6 times), nearly 7 times more than for soybeans and rapeseed, and 2.7 times as much as cotton. For fruits, detailed data are available only for apples. As Table 5 shows, under market demand forces, apple-growing today has become a highly capital-intensive activity, requiring in 2010 yet another 1.7 times as much liquid capital as for vegetables, and 5.2 times as much as for rice.
An approximation of total liquid capital investments in vegetables and fruits can be arrived at by multiplying the investments of "material and service Source. Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007 Quanguo nongchanpin, , 2011 : tables 1-2-2, 1-7-2, 1-8-2, 1-9-2, 1-11-2, 1-12-2, 1-13-2, 1-18-2, 1-21-2. expenses" 物质与服务费用 per mu by total sown acreage, as shown in Table 6 . As can readily be seen, for these two major items of planted products in the new agriculture, the total liquid capital investments amounted in 2010 to 313.5 billion yuan. As for meat production, pork of course remains the largest category of all meats. However, even pig-raising has undergone profound changes in recent years. The traditional model, of course, was the pig as a scavenger for "hogwash" 泔水 (and its manure, converted into compost, was the principal organic fertilizer). But today pig-raising has become increasingly modernized and capitalized. The main indication of this is the much greater reliance on manufactured high-quality feed 精饲料, traditionally referring to grain feed rather than stalks and leaves and scraps, but today often high-quality manufactured feed. A second important indicator is greater and greater expenditures for the purchase of higher-value piglets 仔猪. According to the costs-benefĳits sampling data, today both scattered and scale raising of pigs rely mainly on manufactured feed and high-value piglets. These data show liquid capital investments totaling 900 yuan (per 100 kilograms, or about 1.5 pigs) (including both "scattered raising" 散养 and "scale raising" 规模养猪), about three times that for the "old agriculture" of grain per mu (Quanguo nongchanpin, 2007 (Quanguo nongchanpin, , 2011 : tables 1-20-2, 1-19-2).
To get a quantitative sense of the total picture of major animal products, Table 7 tallies the amounts of total liquid capital investments (again using "material and service expenses" as an approximation) of the major products. To separate out investments by small-scale farm households from investments Note. In computing liquid capital investments, only the "direct costs" 直接费用 of the "materials and service inputs" are counted, and not the "indirect costs" 间接 费用 (i.e., depreciation and tax).
by so-called big household entities 大户 and agricultural fĳirms/enterprises 农 业公司/企业, we employ the standard divisions between small and mediumto-large scale operations used in the statistical data. For pork, the line drawn is at the scale of 99 pigs. Individual households can manage easily 10 pigs, and more if production is well and efffĳiciently organized (e.g., in new-style pig pens); raising dozens of pigs is not uncommon for a single peasant household. (With a high degree of automation at the frontier of modernization of hog raising, one labor unit can oversee as many as 200 pigs or more.) For milk cows, we use the statistical divide of 9 head as the upper limit of what a household can manage and, for beef cattle, 49 head. Similarly, for lambs and sheep, 99 head; for meat chickens, 1,999 chickens; for egg chickens, also 1,999. The result may be seen as an approximation of such products raised by small households, in which the household itself is the main source of labor (i.e., still the "family farm"), exclusive of the so-called big household 大户 entities that employ more than casual labor and the agricultural fĳirms based principally on hired labor. (For actual examples of the diffferent scales of production of the diffferent products, see Yidu shi renmin zhengfu, 2012.) Source. The data on meat animals for slaughter 出栏 come from Zhongguo xumu nianjian, 2010; the liquid capital data are from Quanguo nongchanpin, 2010: tables 5-1-2, 5-5-2, 5-6-2, 5-7-2, 5-10-2, 5-13-2. Note. In computing liquid capital investments, only the "direct costs" of "material and service inputs" are counted, not the indirect costs (i.e., depreciation and tax).
As can readily be seen, the total for these major products amounted in 2010 to 905.1 billion yuan, which is obviously an incomplete count, but perhaps a good approximation of the great majority of animal products production of the new agriculture (excluding fĳisheries, that is, for which no data have been available after 2007).2
Adding together our tallies of liquid capital investments in the new agriculture-313.5 billion yuan + 905.1 billion yuan-we arrive at a total of 1,218.6 billion yuan. If we add to that fĳigure the total investments in fĳixed assets of 230.5 billion yuan, we arrive at a total fĳigure of 1,449.1 billion yuan of capital investments in small-scale new agriculture. This should be taken as the minimum amount of capital investments today by peasant family farms in the new agriculture.
Adding further our (revised lower) fĳigure of 244.0 billion yuan of liquid capital investments in the old agriculture, we come to a grand total of 1,693.1 billion yuan of capital investments, both liquid and fĳixed, and both old and new in 2010. That amounts to 41.8 percent of the agricultural GDP (4,053.4 billion yuan) of that year, a fĳigure that dwarfs total state investments in agriculture by a considerable margin, as will be seen below.
At the same time as the expanding capital investments detailed above, the size of the rural labor force declined markedly. As shown in Table 8 Of course, the decline by one-third of the number of people employed in agriculture, coupled with the capital investments detailed above, means considerable increases in capital inputs per unit labor (i.e., "capitalization" as used in this article), by another 50 percent above the dimensions detailed for capital investment increases alone. Needless to say, such a change is itself a major dynamic for the rising price of rural labor.
Wage Income Origins of Capital Investments
The chief dynamic behind the changes outlined above is rising opportunities and wages for offf-farm employment, such that peasants have come to expect not 20-30 yuan per day, but rather 50-100 yuan. Those changed expectations have propelled peasants to turn to ever greater capitalization of the old agriculture, in order to save time, and to greater and greater involvement in the new agriculture, for higher returns. Data on rural residents' incomes 农村居民收入 include fĳigures on "wagelike income" 工资性收入, mainly of the 80 million "leave the land but not the village" 离土不离乡 peasants employed in "township enterprises" 乡镇企业 (Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2011: table 11-5). They show a total of (2,431 yuan/rural resident × 750 million rural residents =) 1,755.7 billion yuan of such wage-like income in 2010. This fĳigure should be distinguished from the income of the "leave both the land and the village" 离土又离乡 peasant migrant workers, who in 2010 totaled 153 million, earning a total of (2,049 yuan/month × 9.8 months worked per year × 1.53 million migrant workers =) 3,072.2 billion yuan (Zhongguo guojia tongjiju, 2011) . Combining the wage incomes of those working offf-farm at home and the wages incomes of those working away from home, we get a total of nearly 5,000 billion yuan in wage income for the 900 million people offfĳicially registered as peasants.
As can readily be seen, peasant wage income goes a long way toward explaining the bulk of the new capital investments peasants have made in farming. That is what has propelled, and paid for, the resort in the old agriculture to hiring more tractor plowing-planting-harvesting and using more farm chemicals, in preference to hand plowing-planting-harvesting and hand weeding. It is also what has paid for the greatly increased fĳixed and operating capital investments in the new agriculture.
While peasant choices are readily understandable in terms of the rising opportunity costs for farm labor, the underlying logic is perhaps not immediately apparent. What happens, in efffect, is that in choosing offf-farm work over the original farmwork (like hand plowing and planting, hand weeding and hand harvesting), more and more peasant households are in efffect using incomes from offf-farm employment to pay for the labor-saving and higher-return inputs or, in other words, for the further capitalization of farming. There are those who remain at home and contribute all or most of their earnings to the maintenance and capitalization of the family farm 经营费 for higher returns, and there are those who leave for the cities, who send part of their earnings home (to an unquantifĳiable extent), also to help pay for the maintenance of the family farm. Considering what peasants have had to put up with in discriminatory treatment in their offf-farm employment, we might (if we were to dramatize the point) call such capital "blood and sweat capital" 血汗资本, to distinguish it from our conventional notions of capital (operating capital or capital in fĳixed assets) invested by private fĳirms or the state.
The New Age Agricultural Revolution
In the Reform era, the gross value of agricultural products has in fact increased at an average rate of about 6 percent per year (in "comparable prices" 可比价 格), doubling every twelve years and quadrupling in twenty-four years. These are dimensions that dwarf the older forms of agricultural revolutions, whether the classical English agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century or the 1960s and after "green revolution." Most of the increase in the output value of agricultural products has of course come from the new agriculture. The increased cultivation of high-value vegetables and fruits is reflected in the quadrupling (407 percent) of the output value of "agriculture" 农业, meaning in this context planted products 种植业 产品. The nearly six-fold rise (587 percent) in the output value of "big agriculture" 大农业, which includes "forestry," "animal husbandry" and "fĳishery," on the other hand, is to be accounted for mainly by the tremendous rise in meat products (1,043 percent) and in fĳish farming (1,904 percent), separately placed under "animal husbandry" 牧业 and "fĳisheries" 渔业 (see Table 9 ). Table 10 provides a clearer picture of the composition of the new age agricultural revolution. As can readily be seen, the output values of vegetables and fruits per sown mu are generally three times that of grain. Thus, in 2010, whereas grains, at 55.9 percent of sown acreage, accounted for just 15.9 percent of total agricultural output value, less than one-third of its proportion of sown acreage, the output values of vegetables and fruits amounted to just about the same as their proportions of sown acreage. In 1980, vegetables and fruits amounted to just 3.4 percent of the total sown acreage; in 2010, they made up 25.9 percent. They are the major components of the new agriculture, in terms of planted products (Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2011: table 6-14; Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2002: table 6-14). As for meats, in terms of output value they have come to account for fully 30 percent of all farm products. If one adds fĳisheries, which account for 9.3 percent, the total of meats and fĳish amounts to 39.3 percent of all output value; in 1978, meats-fĳish amounted to just 17 percent of all agricultural output value. Vegetables + fruits and meats + fĳish are the main components of the new agriculture that has propelled China's new age agricultural revolution.
Appropriate Scale Farms
In the projection Philip Huang made with Yusheng Peng in their 2007 article, based on trends in birthrates, in offf-farm employment and farm employment, and in changing consumption patterns, they estimated that in twenty-fĳive years time (i.e., ca. 2030), the average Chinese farm will have reached appropriate scales. Those may be considered 15 mu per farm in the old agriculture (of grain, cotton, and oil crops farming), or 3.0 mu of tented vegetables, mushrooms, fruits, nurseries (for flowers and plants) in the new agriculture. With current technologies in the new and old agriculture, those farm dimensions would represent full employment for farming households, and would bring incomes consistent with such employment (Huang Zongzhi and Peng Yusheng, 2007) . There is no 1990 fĳigure for just "grains."
We might take the situation in the year 2006 reflected in the second nationwide survey of agriculture as our baseline, given its systematic householdby-household data gathering. A total of 200 million (200, 159, 127 to be exact) households were surveyed, and their farms broken down into diffferent scales and sizes. The data do not distinguish between old and new agriculture farms. If we use them for an indication only of appropriate scale farms in the old agriculture (amounting to about 70 percent of all sown acreage), we fĳind that family farms of 15 mu or more totaled 15.1 million, or 7.7 percent of all family farms (Zhongguo di er ci, 2009: table 2-7-1) . In addition, we have data on "farms with infrastructure" 设施农业, referring specifĳically to hothouses, and small and medium tents 中小棚 and large plastic tents 大棚, which totaled 11.7 million mu (11,655,000), or 3.9 million farm households (assuming 2 labor units working 1.5 mu each), or about 2 percent of all farms (Zhongguo di er ci, 2008: 7) . The total of "appropriate scale" farms in the old agriculture and in new- 
A Macroeconomic View
We are now ready to take a macroeconomic look at total investments in agriculture. To be sure, the state has played and continues to play a major role, through its investments in infrastructure 基本建设, research and development of agricultural technology 科技三项费用, and agricultural subsidies 支援农村生产支出 and services 农业事业费. In 2010 those totaled 858 billion yuan (Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 2011: table 5-1) . But if we include just the infrastructural investments (and leave out the remainder, namely agricultural extension services and subsidies and services), those amounted in 2010 to 240 billion yuan, as has been seen. By comparison, agricultural investments in fĳixed assets (mainly in the new agriculture) by individual peasants/ households 农村个体/农户 total about 230.5 billion yuan, as shown in Table 1 , nearly comparable to fĳixed assets investments by the state.
It is in liquid capital investments that peasant households tower above the state and agricultural fĳirms. Since peasant household farms account for by far the greatest proportion of cultivated land, compared to state farms, which are only about 0.5 percent (0.9亿亩/18亿亩 = 0.5 percent; Zhongguo zhuyao nianfen guoyou nongchang jiben qingkuang, 2010) of all cultivated acreage, and wage-labor based capitalist farms, only about 3 percent of all labor input, their operating capital investments unquestionably total many times those of the state and private fĳirms.
Total liquid capital investments by peasant households, we have seen, amounted in 2010 to 407.3 billion yuan in the old agriculture, 313.5 billion yuan just in vegetables and apples (the two big items of the new agriculture's planted products), and at least 905.1 billion yuan in the new agriculture's major animal products, to make up a total of 1,218.6 billion yuan.
Unfortunately, we do not have good fĳigures for capital investments by agricultural fĳirms. Some indication of the extent of fĳixed capital investments by them is given in the data provided by the Offfĳices for Industry-ization of Agriculture 农业产业化办公室 in its 2008 report. According to that report (Zhongguo nongye By the industry-ization of agriculture data referred to above, the so-called "dragon head enterprises" in agriculture are said to have "brought along" 带动 a signifĳicant proportion of all farming households into integrated or industryized 产业化 farming (87 million farming households according to the data of the Ministry of Agriculture's Offfĳices for Industry-ization of Agriculture, or 43.5 percent of all farming households, if we rely on the 200 million farming households fĳigure from the 2006 decennial survey) (Zhongguo nongye chanyehua fazhan baogao, 2008: appendix table 4; Zhongguo di er ci, 2009: table 2-1-14). But, it must be pointed out, the great majority of those "brought along" households operate under "contract farming" (合同、订单、契约) arrangements. In those, it is the family farm, not the agribusiness fĳirm, that bears the expenses for the operating capital investments. In the main, only enterprises based on wage labor bear the operating capital expenditures and those, we have seen, amount to just 3 percent of all labor input in agriculture. State farms, of course, occupy an even smaller percentage-a total of just 0.5 percent of the cultivated area. Peasant family farms, clearly, account for the overwhelming majority of the total cultivated acreage, and our estimate of their total capital investments in agriculture, as has been seen, is more than 1,693.1 billion yuan. That total dwarfs those of the state and of private fĳirms.
Government Investments/Financing of Agriculture
Chinese government expenditures for agriculture (as a percentage of agricultural GDP) are quite low by comparison with developed Western countries like the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, Spain, and Norway, almost all in the 20 percent or above range (see Figures 9 and 10) . To be sure, the Chinese government has in place a relatively highly developed irrigation system and agricultural extension network, but its subsidies for agriculture fall well below those of the developed countries. Substantial increases in total government expenditures for agriculture during recent years, up to about 10 percent by 2006, have brought those in line with countries like Thailand, Indonesia (in 1996) , and Russia (in 2006). Such expenditures had been even lower than in India in 1996 (at about 7-8 percent), but have since increased considerably, surpassing India by a considerable margin by 2006. At the same time, beginning in 2004, the government drastically cut agricultural taxes and fees, eliminating agricultural taxes completely by January 1, 2006. That too had a major efffect. But total investments in agriculture remain comparatively low, especially considering the high proportion of the population engaged in agriculture. Just how low can be dramatized by the fact that, in 2010, while farming accounted for 26 percent of all employed persons in China, state investments in fĳixed assets in agriculture totaled just 2.8 percent of all state investments in fĳixed assets nian quan shehui guding zichan touzi tongji, 2010).
By comparison with the developed countries, including Taiwan and South Korea, another striking diffference is the underdevelopment of rural fĳinance. Until very recently, it was well-nigh impossible for Chinese peasants to obtain credit from formal fĳinancial institutions-i.e., the state's banks. They have had to rely instead on informal networks and institutions-family, friends, and neighbors or rural usurers.
Nevertheless, Chinese agriculture has modernized dramatically in the past fĳifteen years, as has been seen, compiling a record of a 6 percent annual increase in output value, dwarfĳing in dimensions the much-touted "green revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s. Our analysis above suggests that the burden for A r g e n t i n a A u s t r a l i a C a n a d a C z e c h F r a n c e I n d o n e s i a I n d i a I s r a e l T h a i l a n d N e t h e r l a n d s the capitalization or modernization of agriculture has been borne mainly by the 1,693.1 billion yuan of total capital investments by peasant families, coming mainly from their offf-farm wage incomes (totaling about 5,000 billion yuan in 2010). Unfair as that employment has been to the peasants, it has brought the unintended consequence of making traditional handiwork in farming obsolete, replaced by modern farm machinery and herbicides in the old agriculture. This has happened along with investments in modern fĳixed assets (plastic tents, structures, orchards), along with greater operating liquid capital investments to sustain the new agriculture of higher-value agricultural products. The result has been an agricultural revolution as profound as it was unintended. Much more can be done, however.
Conclusion
What is most surprising from this inquiry into data about investments in agriculture is the great importance of peasant household investments, coming mainly from wages earned through offf-farm employment. That has in fact been a major engine in China's agricultural development in the past fĳifteen years. And it is a commonly neglected source of capitalization of agriculture.
But it has occurred with little proletarianization in agriculture itself, in the sense that wage laborers remain a very low percentage of total agricultural employment-only about 3 percent (Huang, Gao, and Peng, 2012) , though very much accompanied by what might be called "semiproletarianization" in the sense of offf-farm employment of some member(s) of the household as wage workers. The majority of peasant households today are in fact what Philip Huang has termed "half worker half cultivator" 半工半耕. It is that semiproletarianization of household members in offf-farm wage work (not in farmwork), with the households combining farming with offf-farm employment, that has not only transformed rural life and rural communities, but farming itself.
Given such a degree of peasant investments in agriculture, it becomes abundantly clear that peasant families need to be seen as a major creative force in agricultural development. Yet that force has not yet been properly recognized, much less harnessed to the extent it could be.
It is time to look for ways to harness the creative energy that peasant "human resources" 农村人力资源 have demonstrated, with their capacity for selfdirected contributions even under the most unfavorable and adverse conditions of urban employment, the more so because of the gross inequities that now exist between urban residents and peasants (by registration), cities and countryside, regular urban employees and peasant migrant workers (nongmingong).
What would be truly transformative for all of the countryside, however, would be a program targeting mainly the small peasant farm, especially those comparatively high-earning peasants who may be able to reach appropriate scales, either with farms of 15 mu or more in the old agriculture or in the smaller labor and capital dual intensifying new agriculture. Such family farms have already contributed greatly to China's agricultural modernization, and they can do much more. Then and only then, would the present gap between city and countryside, and urban employees and rural peasants, be closed. And then and only then, could a domestic market of tremendous depth be generated to sustain stable and long-term Chinese economic development.
